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PARENTS INVOLVED AND RACE-CONSCIOUS
MEASURES: A CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM
JOSEPH 0. OLUWOLE*
PRESTON C. GREEN, III**
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2007, the United States Supreme Court
decided the much anticipated Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11 case. Following the deci-
sion, the media frenzy was instantaneous with various commenta-
tors and reporters stating that the Court had in fact banned all uses
of race in public schools. The sad reality is that those news pieces
were probably the only information and understanding most school
administrators and teachers would ever get on the case. In fact, we
have found that a number of school administrators have this mis-
perception of the decision, fueling a growing hesitancy to imple-
ment any race-conscious measures in their schools. Many of the
media reports relied on Chief Justice Roberts' statement quoting
Brown v. Board of Education2 to say that "[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race." 3 However, the media failed to read the Chief
* Joseph Oluwole, J.D., Ph.D., is an attorney-at-law and an Assistant Professor
of Education Law at Montclair State University.
** Preston C. Green, Ill, J.D., Ed.D., is a Professor of Education Law at The
Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law and the College of
Education.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 127 S.Ct. 2738
(2007). [hereinafter Parents Involved].
2 Brown v. Bd. Of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). [hereinafter
Brown I1].
3 Id. at 2768. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Colorblindness Vindicated, WASH. TIMES,
July 3, 2007, at A12 (stating that "Chief Justice John Roberts sermonized in
Parents Involved: The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discrimination on the basis of race," and concluding that "From its inception, the
signature creed of the United States has been the treatment of persons based on
character, industry and achievement irrespective of skin color. The United States
Supreme Court honored that creed in Parents Involved ... Inestimable national
unity is gained through the constitutional doctrine that there is only one race in
the United States. It is American. Renewed experiments with racial distinctions
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Justice's opinion for context, particularly the preceding sentence in
which the Chief Justice specifically limited this statement to
"schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle,
or that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as
Jefferson County."4 Additionally, some of the news media outlets
reported this statement as the holding of the Court, while in
actuality this was merely a part of the plurality opinion written by
Chief Justice Roberts.5
In this article we examine the various opinions in Parents
Involved. We conclude that the use of race-conscious measures in
public schools is not all unconstitutional. School districts should be
able to use race-conscious measures if they comply with the
various principles we discuss with the opinions here. We start out
with a brief overview of the facts in order to contextualize the
decision.
II. FACTS
Parents Involved was a consolidation of two cases
involving the voluntary adoption of student assignment plans by
two school districts to create racial balance in their schools: Seattle
like those implicated in Parents Involved would fracture that unity") (internal
quotes omitted). In fact, the headlines conveyed much misinformation about the
case as well. See, e.g., Terry Eastland, Robert Rules; The Supreme Court Term
Ends with a 5-4 Decision Against Racial Preferences, WEEKLY STANDARD, July
9, 2007; Kristin Bender & Katy Murphy, Justices Nix Race in School Decision,
INSIDE BAY AREA (Cal.), June 29, 2007; High Court: Districts May Not Use
Race As An Admissions Criteria, Sch. Law Bulletin, August 1, 2007; Tony Cox,
Supreme Court Rejects Use of Race in Schools, Nat I Public Radio, June 28,
2007.
4 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768. In essence, those school districts that
have segregated on the basis of race and not removed the vestiges of past
segregation may constitutionally use race-conscious measures for school
assignments and ostensibly other purposes.
5 Justice Kennedy did not join this part of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion. Id. at
2788. (Kennedy, J., concurring.)
Vol. X-XVI
2007-2008 Parents Involved and Race-Conscious Measures 3
School District No. 1 and the Jefferson County Public Schools. 6 In
Parents Involved I, the Seattle school district implemented various
tiebreakers for assigning students to oversubscribed high schools.
Under the first tiebreaker, students with siblings in the oversub-
scribed school got assigned to the school. For the second
tiebreaker-the tiebreaker challenged in the case-the school's
racial demographics and the race of the applicant student were
determinative. 7 Under the third tiebreaker, the geographic proximi-
ty of the school to the student's residence was dispositive. Parents
Involved in Community Schools, a nonprofit corporation con-
sisting of parents whose children were denied assignment and
parents whose children may be denied assignment to the high
schools of their choice in the future because of their race
challenged the constitutionality of the racial tiebreaker under the
Equal Protection Clause.8 The Court found that the Seattle School
6 The cases are Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F.
Supp.2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001) [hereinafter Parents Involved f]; and
McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Sch., 330 F.Supp.2d 834 (W.D. Ky.
2004) [hereinafter McFarland f]. Both cases involved school district efforts to
achieve racial balancing, and since the Court's holding is applicable to both
cases, the facts of each are not extensively discussed here.
7 The goal of the school district for the 1999-2000 school year was to ensure
racial balance in those schools not within 10 percent of the total white/nonwhite
demographics of the district. Parents Involved 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
Approximately 40 percent of the district's students were white; the remaining 60
percent were classified by the school district as nonwhite for purposes of the
school assignment plan. Id.
8 Parents Involved in Community Schools also challenged the racial tiebreaker
as a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Washington
Civil Rights Act. Parents Involved 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226-27. The federal
district court ruled that the racial tiebreaker did not violate the Washington Civil
Rights Act. Parents Involved 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents Involved 11), 285
F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002) (initially reversing the district court, based on the
appellate court's interpretation of the Washington Consitution); and Parents
Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents Involved I11), 294
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002) (withdrawing the opinion which initially reversed the
district court). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the state-law
question to the state supreme court, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle
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District had never operated segregated schools, nor been under a
desegregation decree.
9
Applying strict scrutiny, the district court found the racial
tiebreaker narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.10 A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
ruling that while racial diversity and the avoidance of racial isola-
tion are compelling interests, the racial tiebreaker was not narrowly
tailored." Rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit overruled
the panel, finding the racial tiebreaker narrowly tailored. 12
In McFarland I, Jefferson County Public Schools adopted
a series of voluntary race-based assignment plans to bring the
black enrollment in its non-magnet elementary schools to between
15 and 50 percent of the school population. 13 The Jefferson County
Public Schools had run segregated public schools 14 and was
consequently subjected to a desegregation decree in 1975.15 The
school district was under this decree until the year 2000 when a
federal district court dissolved the decree, after finding that the
Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved IV), 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), which
held that the Washington Civil Rights Act only prohibits programs using race or
gender to select less qualified applicants over more qualified ones. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents Involved V), 149
Wash. 2d 660 (2003) (en banc).
9 See Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2747. The dissenting Justices disagreed with
this however. Id. at 2812. ("The plurality's claim that Seattle was 'never
segregated by law' is simply not accurate").
'o See Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp.2d at 1224.
" See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents
Involved VI), 337 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004).
12 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents
Involved VIII), 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
13 Approximately 34 percent of the district's students are black while a majority
of the other 66 percent is white. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Public
Schs., 330 F. Supp.2d 834, 840.
14 See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson County, 489
F.2d 925, 927 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated
with modifications, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
15 See Hampton v. Jefferson County. Bd. of Ed., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753 (W.D. Ky.
1999) (discussing desegregation lawsuits in Jefferson County) [hereinafter
Hampton 1].
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school district had achieved unitary status.16 The following year,
the school district voluntarily adopted the race-based assignment
plan challenged in this case. This plan assigns students to schools
based on vacancies and the district's racial guidelines designed to
ensure racial balance. If the assignment of a student to a school
would result in racial imbalance of the school, the student was
denied admission to the school.17
After her son was denied transfer to a school within
proximity of his house because of racial imbalance, petitioner
Crystal Meredith challenged the plan as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. The federal district court ruled that the school
district's plan was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest in racially diverse schools.' 8 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. 19
III. THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Parents Involved VII and McFarland 1120 were appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. In both cases, the issue before
the Court was whether a public school that had never run legally
segregated schools (Seattle School District No. 1) or has been
found to be unitary (Jefferson County Public Schools) may use
racial classifications in assigning students to schools.
21
'6See Hampton v. Jefferson County. Bd. of Ed., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 382 (W.D.
Ky. 2000) [hereinafter Hampton II].
17 Subsequent to a student's assignment, however, he or she can apply to
transfer; the transfer application can be denied due to oversubscription or yet
still to avoid racial imbalance. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schs.,
330 F. Supp.2d 834, 844.
18 See id at 840.
'9 See McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schs, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005)
[hereinafter McFarland II].
20 Crystal Meredith, one of the plaintiffs in McFarland I and I1 appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in Parents Involved, the
Supreme Court refers to the McFarland case decision appealed to the Court as
Meredith v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schs. See Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. 2738,
2747 and 2750.
21 See id, at 2746.
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The Court held that racial classifications for the purpose of
achieving racial balancing are unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Alito, Kennedy,
Scalia and Thomas made for the 5-4 judgment and the Court
opinion. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part with
the plurality opinion of Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito and Chief
Justice Roberts. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.
Justice Breyer as well as Justice Stevens wrote dissenting opinions;
Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter
and Stevens. We examine these opinions next, pointing out that the
use of race-conscious measures by school districts is not all
forbidden by the Justices.
Justice Kennedy, being the swing vote in the case, could
play the pivotal role in a constitutional challenge to race-conscious
measures. The dissenting Justices seem in favor of racial classi-
fications in the context of schools, if used for beneficial purposes.
Therefore, if Justice Kennedy votes with those Justices who
dissented in Parents Involved, that would be adequate to uphold
race-conscious measures against constitutional challenge. As
demonstrated below, there is also a possibility that Chief Justice
Roberts might be open to supporting race-conscious measures
other than racial balancing. While the Chief Justice's vote would
not be required for a majority to uphold race-conscious measures,
it would be a "plus factor." In contextualizing the Court's opinion,
it is important to keep in mind that the Court found classifications
designed to achieve racial balancing unconstitutional in Parents
Involved.22 Chief Justice Roberts specifically emphasized this.
23
The various opinions in the case present some universal principles
applicable to the Equal Protection racial classifications
jurisprudence that could inform and help predict how the Court
might analyze race-conscious measures challenged in the future.
We identify these principles as part of the analysis of the opinions
below.
22 See id. at 2753-54.
23 See id. at 2766.
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A. The Court Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts started out the Court opinion by
iterating that Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence requires that
racial classifications used to determine the distribution of gover-
nment benefits or burdens must be reviewed under the strict
scrutiny tier of constitutional review.24 He declared that the Court
had recognized two compelling reasons for school districts to use
racial classifications: (i) remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination;25 and (ii) enhancing diversity at the university
24 See id at 2751-52. In support of this declaration that strict scrutiny applies to
racial classifications used in the distribution of not only burdens but benefits as
well, Chief Justice Roberts cited Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) in which the Court held that all racial classifications (including
benign racial classifications), are subject to strict scrutiny. Cf id at 2816-17
(According to the dissenting Justices in Parents Involved, this holding in
Adarand merely means that traditional strict scrutiny-i.e. strict scrutiny that is
"strict in theory but fatal in fact" is applicable to exclusionary uses of racial
classifications, while benign, beneficial or inclusionary uses of racial classifica-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny that is not "strict in theory but fatal in fact").
In other words, "[a]lthough all governmental uses of race are subject to strict
scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it." Id. at 2817, (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003)). Explaining this distinction further, the dissenting
Justices stated that "the cases to which the plurality refers, though all applying
strict scrutiny, do not treat exclusive and inclusive uses the same. Rather, they
apply the strict scrutiny test in a manner that is "fatal in fact" only to racial
classifications that harmfully exclude; they apply the test in a manner that is not
fatal in fact to racial classifications that seek to include." Id (emphasis added).
Castigating the plurality for seeking to apply strict scrutiny "strict in theory but
fatal in fact" to inclusionary uses of racial classifications, the dissenting Justices
stated: "Today's opinion reveals that the plurality would rewrite this Court's
prior jurisprudence, at least in practical application, transforming the strict
scrutiny test into a rule that is fatal in fact across the board. In doing so, the
plurality parts company from this Court's prior cases, and it takes from local
government the longstanding legal right to use race-conscious criteria for
inclusive purposes in limited ways." Id. at 2817-18 (internal quotes omitted).
25 Id at 2751-52, (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)).
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
level,26 specifically "[s]tudent body diversity ... not focused on
race alone but encompass[ing] all factors that may contribute to
student body diversity. ' 27 While Chief Justice Roberts' opinion
only identified these two interests as compelling in the school
context, the opinion does not foreclose the Court finding other
interests to be compelling. 28 In other words, the identification of
two does not make for exclusivity.
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court found that since
the Seattle Public Schools had never been subject to a court-
ordered desegregation decree nor segregated by law, the school
26 Id. at 2753 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. 306). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy seems to disagree with this part of the opinion limiting the compelling
interest in diversity to higher education. Id. at 2793 (internal citations omitted)
See id. (stating, "As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of the
interest in remedying past intentional discrimination in Freeman v. Pitts, and of
the interest in diversity in higher education in Grutter. At the same time, these
compelling interests, in my view, do help inform the present inquiry. And to the
extent the plurality opinion can be interpreted to foreclose consideration of these
interests, I disagree with that reasoning"). See also id. at 2794 ("[T]o say that
college cases are simply not applicable to public school systems in kindergarten
through high school, this would seem to me wrong"; and "Seattle's plan, by
contrast, relies upon a mechanical formula that has denied hundreds of students
their preferred schools on the basis of three rigid criteria: placement of siblings,
distance from schools, and race. If those students were considered for a whole
range of their talents and school needs with race as just one consideration,
Grutter would have some application"). While the discussion of the compelling
interest in student body diversity in higher education is included in the case as
part of the majority opinion, to the extent it limits this interest to higher
education, it is a plurality opinion.
27 Id. at 2753 (internal citations omitted).
28 See id. at 2752. (Chief Justice Roberts affirms this in stating, as a prelude to
the two compelling interests identified in the case, that "Without attempting in
these cases to set forth all the interests a school district might assert [as
compelling], it suffices to note that our prior cases, in evaluating the use of
racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests that
qualify as compelling." Id. (emphasis added) (alteration to original). The Chief
Justice thereby acknowledges the possibility of other compelling interests for
use of racial classifications in the distribution of burdens or benefits).
Vol. X-XVI
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district had no compelling interest in remedying effects of past
intentional discrimination.29 Jefferson County Public Schools, on
the other hand, had been subject to a desegregation decree until
2000 and been segregated by law. According to the Court,
however, dissolution of this decree and the coterminous finding
that the school district had eliminated vestiges of past intentional
discrimination meant the school district did not have a compelling
interest in remedying effects of past intentional discrimination
through its race-based plan.31 A principle which emerges from this
rationale is that those school districts which were previously
segregated by law and are still subject to a desegregation decree
could justify the use of race-conscious measures with the com-
pelling interest in "remedying effects of past intentional discri-
mination." 32 In other words, as long as the "harm being reme-
died" 33 is "traceable to segregation," 34 race-conscious measures
might be upheld by at least a 5-4 Court. Per contra, once school
districts attain unitary status, Parents Involved suggests that the
Court would no longer recognize as compelling any school
district's interest in remedying effects of past intentional
discrimination.
35
Chief Justice Roberts limited the compelling interest in
student body diversity to the context of higher education.36 As
discussed below, however, Justice Kennedy disagreed with this
limitation. 37 If the context of diversity is limited to higher
education, race-conscious measures designed to achieve diversity
29 id.
30 Hampton II, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
31 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2752 ("Once Jefferson County achieved unitary
status, it had remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed race-based




35 See id at 2753.
36 See id
37 See id at 2793. Justice Kennedy believes that the compelling interest in
student body diversity is applicable to K-12 education as well.
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in K-12 education cannot have a compelling interest in diversity.38
Perhaps conceding the possibility of the student body diversity as a
compelling interest in K-12 education, the Chief Justice took great
pains to explain the nature and details of this interest, 39 suggesting
38 Moreover, the form of diversity the Court recognizes, at least in the context of
admissions, is not one focused solely on race, as "there are many possible bases
for diversity admissions" Id. at 2753. Examples include "admittees who [i] have
lived or traveled widely abroad, [ii] are fluent in several languages, [iii] have
overcome personal adversity and family hardship, [iv] have exceptional records
of extensive community service, and [v] have had successful careers in other
fields" Id., quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. See also id., quoting Grutter, 539
U.S. at 325 and University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that the compelling interest in student body
diversity involves "a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element"). See id.
at 2754 (suggesting that the Court endorses a broad notion of diversity in
student admissions and faulting the plans under consideration in the case for the
limited notion of diversity) ("Even when it comes to race, the plans here employ
only a limited notion of diversity").
39 In fact, the Chief Justice goes on to compare the admissions plan here to the
University of Michigan undergraduate plan in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (suggesting that if the plans in this case allowed for highly individualized
consideration of applicants, it might be upheld by the Court). See Parents
Involved, 127 S.Ct. 2753-54, quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. 276, 280 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (internal quotes omitted) ("Like the University of Michigan
undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, the plans here 'do not provide for a
meaningful individualized review of applicants' but instead rely on racial
classifications in a 'nonindividualized, mechanical' way"). Additionally, as part
of Chief Justice Roberts' comparative analysis of K-12 and higher education
jurisprudence, he suggests that student body diversity might have been a
compelling interest in Parents Involved if the review of applicants had been
highly individualized. After emphasizing the paramountcy of highly
individualized review of applicants to a compelling interest in diversity, he
stated: "In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered as part of a
broader effort to achieve 'exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and
viewpoints;' race, for some students, is determinative standing alone." Parents
Involved, 127 S.Ct. 2753 (emphasis added). This extensive comparative analysis
seems to confirm this concession. Cf Chief Justice Roberts uses a similar
rationale to express the concession inherent in an extensive discussion of a point
in responding to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion: "Certainly if.. .the stark use
of race in these cases were as established as the dissent would have it, there
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that if race is only "part of a highly individualized, holistic
review,' '4° the use of racial classifications in admissions will be
constitutional.'
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the justification for
limiting diversity as a compelling interest to higher education is
"the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, [and because] universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition. 42 A major problem
with this justification is that it fails to explain why freedom of
speech is not expansive in the K-12 environment or why
universities, and not K-12 schools, occupy a special niche in
constitutional tradition.43 Therefore, if this justification is critically
parsed, the Chief Justice might see reason to extend it to K-12
education.
Under strict scrutiny analysis, even when classifications
serve a compelling interest, the means chosen to serve the
compelling interest must be narrowly tailored.44 Parents Involved,
provides principles of the "narrow tailoring" requirement which
would have been no need for the extensive analysis undertaken in Grutter." Id.
at 2764.
40 Id. at 2753.
41 The emphasis on the use of race in admissions as only part of a "highly
individualized" review is evident throughout the Court's opinion. See, e.g., id.
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337) ("[t]he importance of this individualized
consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is
paramount")). While individualized review is highly pertinent in the context of
admissions, other race-conscious measures could be designed to be more global
and generalized. In other words, while admissions allow for individualized
consideration of each student, other race-conscious measures might not
necessarily be tied to individualized consideration of each student. Moreover,
admissions affect students on a highly individualized level as a particular
student is specifically individually rejected or admitted.4 1 Id. at 2754.
43 Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, agrees, adding that "education in
the elementary and secondary environment generally does not involve the free
interchange of ideas thought to be an integral part of higher education." Id at
2781-82. However, he also fails to give a rationale beyond this conclusory
statement.
44 See id. at 2752.
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could help illuminate how the Court would analyze future uses of
race-conscious measures in schools. The Court found that the race-
based assignment plans in Seattle and Jefferson County were not
narrowly tailored because they had minimal impact on student
assignments.45 For example, the Court noted that "Jefferson
County's use of racial classifications has only a minimal effect on
the assignment of students.' 46 Additionally, "[a]s Jefferson County
explains, the racial guidelines have minimal impact in this process,
because they mostly influence student assignment in subtle and
indirect ways. 47 Accenting this "minimal effect/impact" principle
of the narrow tailoring requirement, the Court stated that "the
minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications on school
enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using racial
classifications. ' '48 It seems that race-conscious measures which
impact on equal educational opportunity are neither subtle nor
indirect and clearly beyond minimal might satisfy this "minimal
effect/impact" principle articulated in Parents Involved, if they
also satisfy a second principle, discussed next.
The second principle of narrow tailoring identifiable from
the case is the "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives.' 49 Thus, school districts might seek to
document serious good-faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives, if their race-conscious measures are to fully
satisfy the "narrow tailoring" requirement. As the Court50 noted in
45 See id. at 2759. See id. at 2759-60 (stating with respect to Seattle's plan:
"Seattle's racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of
students between schools"; "[i]n over one-third of the assignments affected by
the racial tiebreaker, then, the use of race in the end made no difference").
46 Id at 2760 (stating as well that "Jefferson County estimates that the racial
guidelines account for only 3 percent of assignments.").
47 Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
48 Id (emphasis added). The "necessity" language is indicative of the narrow
tailoring requirement.
49 Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
50 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 and Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2760
(emphasis added).
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Grutter, "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative." 51 With respect to the student
assignment plans in Parents Involved, the Court found each school
district gave "little or no consideration" 52 to race-neutral alterna-
tives. 53 Therefore, while the Court does not expect school districts
to consider every conceivable race-neutral alternative, it expects
them to give more than "little or no consideration" to the
alternatives.
Another principle of narrow tailoring the Court applied was
"the diversity of racial classification used. 54 For example, in the
Parents Involved case, the Court declared that "even when it
comes to race, the plans here employ only a limited notion of
diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in
Seattle and black/"other" terms in Jefferson County. 55 In essence,
the Court would likely reject plans using binary racial classifica-
tions. School districts seeking to use race-conscious measures
would increase their chances of surviving judicial scrutiny if their
plans use "multivariate" racial classifications. 56 In other words,
school districts might be better off not relying on strict binary
categories of white versus nonwhite as in the Seattle plan or black
versus "other" as in the Jefferson County plan.
57
51 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2760 (emphasis added).
52 id,
51 Id. ("[I]n Seattle several alternative assignment plans.. .were rejected with
little or no consideration ... Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence
that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its
goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifica-
tions") (internal quotes omitted).
54 Id. at 2754.
55 Id.
56 Id. In fact, in rejecting the binary racial classifications used in the Seattle and
Jefferson County plans, the Court quoted Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990), stating that "We are a
Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent commu-
nities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, by
individuals." Id.
57 The same reasoning would apply if the binary classification of white versus
Hispanic or white versus Asian American was used in a race-conscious plan.
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B. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion addressed the other interests the
school districts presented as compelling interests in justification of
their race-based plans. Seattle contended that it had compelling
interests in: (i) decreasing racial concentration in its schools; 58 and
(ii) in assuring access to the best schools for its nonwhite students,
despite racially segregated housing patterns. 59 Jefferson County, on
the other hand, claimed that it had a compelling interest in
educating students in a racially-integrated environment.60 The
Court rejected these as compelling interests.
Both school districts claimed that: (i) educational benefits;
and (ii) socialization benefits result from these compelling
interests. Key to the plurality's rejection of these as compelling
interests was the disputed nature of the evidence about the
interests. 6 1 For example, the plurality expressed its unwillingness
to accept the asserted interests because of the disputed nature of
the evidence over whether racial diversity in schools actually has
"a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or
achieves intangible socialization benefits." 62 In essence, school
districts that are able to document that their race-conscious
measures have marked impact on education, measured by objective
yardsticks, might have stronger confidence in gaining support from
the plurality. Also, the less disputed the evidence in the "battle of
experts" over whether race-conscious measures actually produce
the educational and social benefits asserted by a school district, the
58 See id at 2755.
'9 See id
60 See Id. According to the plurality racial balancing, racial integration, racial
proportionality, and avoidance of racial isolation are all synonyms and cannot be
relabeled as racial diversity to create a different meaning-diversity-while tied
to racial demographics. Id. at 2758-59. See also id. at 2779 (Justice Thomas,
concurring) (including "environmental reflection" as another synonym for racial
balancing); id. at 2787 (including "racial engineering").
61 Id. at 2755; see also id at 2776-79 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62 id.
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more likely it seems the plurality might support their use of race-
conscious measures.
Besides, the plurality found that the race-based plans were
not narrowly tailored to the educational and socialization benefits
the school districts asserted would result from racial diversity. The
failure of the school districts to link the plans to "any pedagogic
concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted
educational benefits ', 63 was evidence that the plans were not
narrowly tailored. In essence, if race-conscious measures are
linked to a pedagogic concept, rather than merely premised on
district racial demographics, the measures might satisfy the
"narrow tailoring" requirement.64
School districts might thus seek to ensure that their race-
conscious measures are tailored to achieve asserted educational or
socialization benefits, as opposed to racial balancing in itself.
65
63 Id.
64 See id at 2755-56.
65 Another indicium of narrow tailoring is the identification of a "meaningful
number necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body." Id. at 2756-57.
A problem the plurality found with the plans in Parents Involved with respect to
this indicium included the fact that the numbers identified by the school districts
as necessary for racial balancing sometimes seemed inconsistent, and conse-
quently not meaningful, with respect to diversity. For example, the plurality
notes that Seattle failed to show "how the educational and social benefits of
racial diversity or avoidance of racial isolation are more likely to be achieved at
a school that is 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian-American, which would
qualify as diverse under Seattle's plan, than at a school that is 30 percent Asian-
American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent
white, which under Seattle's definition would be racially concentrated." Id. at
2756. As further example of this failure to demonstrate meaningful numbers for
its goal of diversity, the plurality cited Franklin High School in Seattle, which
racial demographics (below) the plurality characterized as substantially diverse
with or without the tiebreaker "under any definition of diversity." Id. at 2757:
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Underscoring this principle, the plurality noted with respect to the
plans in this case, for example, that if
the racial demographics in each district-whatever they
happen to be--drive the required diversity numbers[,] [t]he
plans here are not tailored to achieving a degree of diversity
necessary to realize the asserted educational benefits; in-
stead, the plans are tailored ... to the goal established by
the school board of attaining a level of diversity within the
schools that approximates the district's overall demo-
graphics.
66
Racial Asian- African- Native-
Demographics American American Latino American Caucasian
Without Racial
Tiebreaker 39.6% 30.2% 8.3% 1.1% 20.8%
With Racial
Tiebreaker 30.3% 21.9% 6.8% 0.5% 40.5%
Furthermore, the plurality stated that meaningful numbers to diverse student
bodies must be forward-working toward "the level of diversity that provides the
purported benefits," rather than backward-working "to achieve a particular type
of racial balance." Id. This might suggest also that race-conscious measures
which are forward-working toward equal educational opportunity might have a
better chance of surviving scrutiny. Interestingly enough, Justice Thomas in his
concurrence, though fully agreeing with the plurality opinion, ("I wholly concur
in THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion") (emphasis in original), uses what seems to
be the same term in an ostensibly contradictory way to the Chief Justice's. Id. at
2768. Using the term, forward-looking, he chides the school districts for
providing forward-looking interests, rather than remedial (backward-looking)
interests as justifications for their plans, thus finding that the school districts had
no constitutionally permissible interest in remedying past segregation or prior
discrimination for which they were individually responsible. Id. at 2772.
66 Id. at 2755-56 (internal quotes omitted). The fact "that the level of racial
diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to
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In other words, what the plurality really objects to is racial
balancing for its own sake.
School districts might be well-advised to ensure that any
race-conscious measures adopted have a logical stopping point. In
addition to the school districts' failures to satisfy the "narrow
tailoring" principles above, the plurality rejected the race-based
plans in Parents Involved as not narrowly tailored because there
was no logical stopping point to the plans.67 As evidence of this
lack of a logical stopping point, the plurality noted that with eternal
demographics shifts, so would the school districts' definition of
racial diversity. Thus, school districts might want to avoid tying
their race-conscious measures to demographic shifts. Moreover, as
soon as the race-conscious measure achieves its purpose, mecha-
nisms must be created in the plan to assure the measure lapses.
School districts might also consider formative evaluations of their
measures to ensure that the logical stopping point is triggered once
the asserted interest(s) is achieved.
An additional reason the plurality rejected the Seattle plan
under the "narrowly tailored" requirement was the "[t]he sweep of
the mandate claimed by the district."68 This mandate broadly
encompassed the remedying of past societal discrimination which
the Court has rejected as justification for race-conscious actions.
69
Societal discrimination is defined as "discrimination not traceable
to its [school district's] own actions., 70 The lesson from this is that
race-conscious measures that are not designed to remedy societal
coincide with the racial demographics of the respective school districts," Id at
2756, does not per se make a race-based plan not narrowly tailored, as long as
the evidence of this coincidence is presented. Id. It is not sufficient to "simply
assume that the educational benefits [asserted] track the racial breakdown of the
district." Id.
67 Id. at 2758 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)).
68 Id.
69 Id (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70 Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
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discrimination have a greater chance of surviving "narrow tailor-
ing" muster. School districts might be helped to design their race-
conscious measures as forward-working measures to attain equal
educational opportunity.
71
Strong evidence that race-conscious measures are not all
unconstitutional contrary to widespread belief is evident in the
following portion of the plurality opinion:
other means-e.g., where to construct new schools, how to
allocate resources among schools, and which academic
offerings, to provide to attract students to certain schools-
implicate different considerations than the explicit racial
classifications at issue in these cases, and we express no
opinion on their validity-not even in dicta.
7 2
In essence, the plurality unequivocally stated that Parents Involved
was not an invalidation of all race-conscious measures. It should
also be welcome optimism that the plurality opinion concludes on
this positive note, after copiously castigating the school districts
for the use of racial-balancing plans.73
C. Justice Thomas' Concurrence
Of all the opinions filed in Parents Involved, Justice
Thomas' is the one unmistakably against all uses of race-conscious
measures. This is especially evident in his persistent and inexor-
able view that the Constitution is color-blind, precluding all uses of
racial classifications.7 4 Justice Thomas believes that giving school
7' The plurality also stated that school districts must not be given deference to
use racial classifications for the distribution of burdens or benefits; rather,
school districts have the burden of justifying their race-based policies. This is
contrary to the dissenting opinion. See infra Part IIl.F.
72 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2766 (emphasis added).
73 
id.
74 See id. at 2768, 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the view that the
Constitution is color-blind was first articulated by Justice John Marshall Harlan
(citing Plessy, 163 U.S. 559 (Harlan, J. dissenting))); see also Grutter, 539 U.S.
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districts deference to implement race-conscious measures would be
a throwback to the segregationist expedients.75
The crux of Justice Thomas' rejection of the racial balan-
cing plans and the sole temper of his color-blind view is his
distinction between racial imbalance and segregation.76 While he
would allow the use of race-conscious measures to remedy past
segregation, he is certainly opposed to them for purposes of racial
balancing. In the context of public schools, Justice Thomas defines
segregation as "the deliberate operation of a school system to carry
out a government policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the
basis of race."77 Au contraire, "[r]acial imbalance is the failure of a
school district's individual schools to match or approximate the
demographic makeup of the student population at large. 78
Furthermore, even though racial imbalance could result from past
de jure segregation, innocent actions of private individuals such as
at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).; see also Grutter,
539 U.S. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The view
that the Constitution is color-blind was first articulated by Justice John Marshall
Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Plessy. Justice Kennedy believes this color-
blind view is merely an aspiration and "cannot be a universal constitutional
principle" in the real world. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792.75See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
76 Fundamentally, Justice Thomas believes that "as a general rule, all race-based
government decisionmaking-regardless of context-is unconstitutional." Id. at
2770-71. In making the distinction between racial imbalance and segregation,
Justice Thomas uses the words segregation and resegregation interchangeably.
Although he uses these words interchangeably, when distinguishing resegrega-
tion (or segregation) from past segregation, he appends the word "past" or
"prior." While Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court echoes this
distinction between racial imbalance and segregation, Justice Thomas is the only
one to make this explicit distinction of the terms. Id. at 2752. According to
Justice Thomas, "the further we get from the era of state-sponsored racial
segregation, the less likely it is that racial imbalance has a traceable connection
to any prior segregation." Id. at 2773 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496
and Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 118 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
77 Id at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (internal quotes omitted)).
78 Id.
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voluntary decisions about residential locations79 mostly foment
racial imbalance. 80 This view and distinction accounted for Justice
79 Id. (emphasis in original). In Justice Thomas' view, to constitute de jure
desegregation, "there either will or will not have been a state constitutional
amendment, state statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy
explicitly requiring separation of the races." Id at 2771 n.4. Cf id at 2810
(dissenting justices) (stating that there is futility in "looking simply to whether
earlier school segregation was de jure or de facto in order to draw firm lines
separating the constitutionally permissible from the constitutionally forbidden
use of "race-conscious" criteria" and "our predecent has recognized that dejure
discrimination can be present even in the absence of racially explicit laws").
According to the dissenting Justices, the de jure/de facto distinction only serves
to distinguish "what the Constitution requires school boards to do, not what it
permits them to do." Id. at 2823 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 2823-24
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[als to what is permitted, nothing in our
equal protection law suggests that a State may right only those wrongs that it
committed. No case of this Court has ever relied upon the de jure/de facto
distinction in order to limit what a school district is voluntarily allowed to do.
That is what is at issue here ... significant as the difference between dejure and
de facto segregation may be to the question of what a school district must do,
that distinction is not germane to the question of what a school district may do")
(emphasis in original))). Race-conscious measures voluntarily implemented by
school districts should fall under the "permitted" as opposed to "required."
A distinction Justice Thomas makes between past dejure desegregation
and racial imbalance goes to their logical stopping point as remedies; see id. at
2773. ("Remediation of past dejure segregation is a one-time process involving
the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an identified entity. At some
point, the discrete injury will be remedied, and the school district will be
declared unitary. Unlike de jure segregation, there is no ultimate remedy for
racial imbalance. Individual schools will fall in and out of balance in the natural
course, and the appropriate balance itself will shift with a school district's
changing demographics. Thus, racial balancing will have to take on an indefinite
basis-a continuous process with no identifiable culpable party and no
discernable end point"). An incidental concern to that about the logical stopping
point expressed in his opinion is the challenge of determining the proper scope
of remedy if there is no logical stopping point. As noted earlier, however, school
districts might enhance the chance of surviving scrutiny if their race-conscious
measures are designed with logical stopping points, and not intended to be
indefinite in scope or duration. In other words, the race-conscious measures
should not be "ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to
affect the future," Id. at 2775 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276). Arguably, a
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Thomas' conclusion that, even if, the schools in Seattle and
Jefferson County, might be in danger of racial imbalance, they
were not in danger of resegregation.81 Building on the distinction,
Justice Thomas would allow the use of racial classifications to
remedy past segregation in two "narrowly defined" 82 instances: (i)
a school previously segregated by law, to remedy the prior segre-
gation;83 or (ii) a government agency seeking to remedy past
discrimination for which that agency was responsible.8 4 Under
either exception, however, he would not defer to the school
district, even if the district is acting in good faith.85 There is
optimism, however, for school districts falling under any of the
two narrow exceptions Justice Thomas recognizes, for at least he
indicates he is responsive to such uses of racial classifications.
Further asperity essential to gaining Justice Thomas' vote is
evident in his requirement that school districts and other
government agencies justify the need for racial classifications with
a "strong basis in evidence." 86 To satisfy this standard, specific
findings must be made on each of the following:8 7 (i) the extent of
logical stopping point might be the point of substantial equal educational
opportunity.
80 Parents Involved, 124 S. Ct. at 2769. Justice Thomas believes that school
boards have no interest in using race to remedy past segregation that is not
related to education. See id at 2776 ("school boards have no interest in
remedying the sundry consequences of prior segregation unrelated to schooling,
such as housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social
attitudes"). Thus, in school districts where race-conscious measure is grounded
in a proffered interest in remedying such "sundry consequences", Justice
Thomas' vote might as well be counted as a negative in a constitutional
challenge to the measure.
"1See id. at 2769.




86 Id at 2772 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 500).
87 Justice Thomas does not seem to limit the findings to a judicial finding or a
jury finding, as long as the finding is in the record. He implies that the school
district making the specific findings in the record might suffice. See id. at 2772
("Neither school district has made any such specific findings").
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the school district's past racial discrimination; 88 (ii) the scope of
injury;89 and (iii) "the necessary remedy [which] must be more
than inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs." 90 In Parents
Involved, Justice Thomas found the record was without strong
basis in evidence to support any of these findings; 9' consequently,
he declared the race-based plans unconstitutional under his general
rule. 92
The rigor of Justice Thomas' requirements for using racial
classifications does not stop with those described earlier. He would
also employ a very narrow and stringent test for determining what
qualifies as a "compelling interest" under the strict scrutiny
standard: "only those measures the State must take [i] to provide a
bulwark against anarchy ... or [ii] to prevent violence and [iii] a
government's effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is
responsible constitute compelling interests." 93 It thus should be no
surprise that this acerbic test led him to conclude that the school
districts have not contended, "nor could they,"94 that they had
compelling interests for the plans under his test.95 Under this test,
race-conscious measures would have little chance of surviving
Justice Thomas' strict scrutiny.
The apercu is that the harsh principles for reviewing racial
classifications in Justice Thomas' concurrence seem to be the
result of his pertinacious adherence to the view that the
Constitution is color-blind which he basically interprets as a
88 Id, at 2772 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 504).
89 Id. (quoting Croson, at 505).
90 Id at 2772 (quoting Croson, at 505-06) (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Justice Thomas is amenable to upholding racial balancing as "a constitutionally
permissible remedy for the discrete legal wrong of dejure segregation." Id. at
2773 (emphasis in original).
91 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2772.
92 See text accompanying note 72, supra, for Justice Thomas' general rule.
93 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2782 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351-53
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foreclosure of all uses of race, as evident in the principles
identified from his opinion herein and his general rule articulated
supra.96 In the final analysis, therefore, the lesson from Justice
Thomas's concurrence in Parents Involved is that his vote is
unlikely to favor race-conscious school measures in a constitu-
tional challenge except in the two narrow exceptions discussed
herein.
D. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy's concurrence provides the greatest
optimism for the use of race-conscious measures. Even while
clearly opposed to racial balancing for its own sake, he is amenable
to the use of race-conscious measures.
Unlike the plurality, Justice Kennedy believed that both the
Seattle and Jefferson County school districts had compelling
interests in the use of the race-based assignment. 97 According to
Justice Kennedy, avoidance of racial isolation is a compelling
interest.98 Additionally, he unequivocally stated that "diversity,
depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling
educational goal a school district may pursue." 99 He described this
compelling interest in diversity in K-12 education as an interest in
"a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition."' 100 Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of
the two compelling interests in declaring that:
96 Id. at 2782-83. See also supra text accompanying note 72. Further example of
this harsh principle is his statement that "no contextual detail--or collection of
contextual details-can provide refuge from the principle that under our Consti-
tution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race." Parents
Involved, 127 S.Ct at 2786.
97 Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
98 Id. at 2797.
99 Id. at 2789.
100 Id ("In the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities
it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general
policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition"); see also id. at 2797. This is clearly different from the plurality
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This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its
historic commitment to creating an integrated society that
ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A com-
pelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an
interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise,
may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a
compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
population.101
This, in spite of his belief that the same traditional strict scrutiny
standard the plurality relied on is applicable, and not some diluted
version.
102
To satisfy Justice Kennedy's "narrow tailoring" inquiry,
school districts might be well-advised to have a "thorough
understanding of how a [race-based] plan [they seek to implement]
works."' 3 In the context of race-based student assignments, for
example, this means school districts "must establish, in detail, how
decisions based on an individual student's race are made in a
challenged governmental program."' 0 4 The Jefferson County
Public Schools fell short in this regard. 10 5 Evidence of the school
district's lack of thorough understanding of its plan can be found in
various internal inconsistencies in the plan; Justice Kennedy found
the district was unable to demystify these internal inconsis-
tencies.
°6
opinion which limits the compelling interest in student body diversity to higher
education. He also recognizes a compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation.
Id. at 2797.
1O1 Id. at 2797 (emphasis added). The word "likewise" highlights the fact that
Justice Kennedy views diversity and avoidance of racial isolation as separate
compelling interests.




106 Id. As example of this internal inconsistency, Justice Kennedy pointed out
that while Jefferson County stated that it denied the petitioner's son's kinder-
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A lack of "thorough understanding" of how a race-
conscious measure works would also be evident from a school
district's use of "broad and imprecise"' 0 7 terms to describe the
measure. For example, Justice Kennedy stated that Jefferson
County did not have a "thorough understanding" of how its plan
worked because in describing how the plan worked, it did so in
"broad and imprecise"' 0 8 terms. Seemingly, perspicuity on the
following non-exclusive factors might have made the classifica-
tions not "so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict
scrutiny" 0 9 : (i) "who makes the decisions"; 1° (ii) "what if any
oversight is employed";"'. (iii) the precise circumstances in which
race will determine an assignment;" 2 and (iv) "how it is
determined which of two similarly situated children will be
subjected to a given race-based decision." 113 The lesson for school
districts is that Justice Kennedy would want them to ensure that
any race-based plans they seek to implement not be "broad and
imprecise" nor internally inconsistent, as Jefferson County's
plan. 14 These are indicia he would consider in determining the
garten transfer request under its race-based guidelines, the school district also
stated that the guidelines are not applicable to kindergartens. Id
107 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2790.
108 Id.
109 Id. To make these factors applicable to race-conscious measures, one might




114 For more of Justice Kennedy's findings on the Jefferson County plan's
internal inconsistencies, see id (discussing the internal consistencies and
characterizing them as "competing propositions" and "far-reaching, inconsistent
and ad hoc"). The internal inconsistencies as well as the imprecise descriptions
of the plan made Justice Kennedy conclude the plan was broadly untailored.
Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2789-90. Even though Justice Kennedy found
Seattle's plan to be less imprecise than Jefferson County's, Id. at 2790, it was
nonetheless imprecise and thus not narrowly tailored because the district "failed
to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with fewer than
half of the students classified as white, it has employed the crude racial
categories of white and non-white as the basis for its assignment decisions." Id.
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district's thorough understanding of race-conscious measures, a
determination he considers crucial to the narrow tailoring analysis.
The need for perspicuity in the design of race-conscious measures
is especially important for school districts, because "[w]hen a court
subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe
ambiguities in favor of the State."" 15
School districts seeking to implement race-conscious
measures might find optimism in Justice Kennedy's belief that the
Constitution does not forbid school district efforts to respond to
"de facto resegregation in schooling.""116 Further optimism for
schools seeking to use such measures for equal educational
opportunity is unmistakably evident in his statement that "[s]chool
districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal educational
opportunity." 117 Justice Kennedy recognizes equal educational
opportunity as a legitimate government interest" 8 and maybe even
as a compelling interest.
119
at 2790-91 (internal quotes omitted). Thus, the racial categories used for the
chosen measure of the school district relative to the racial composition of the
district might be an additional factor to those identified above (However, even
then, the school district must explain why and how the chosen racial categories
further its goals. Id.). As mentioned earlier, Justice Kennedy noted that the
factors are not exhaustive Id. at 2790-91; the important thing is to ensure that the
race-conscious measure is as precise Id.; what would constitute precision for a
pertinent race-conscious measure is yet a mystery until a constitutional
challenge to that measure is presented to a court. Cf. id. at 2829 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the imprecisions referred to are "failures of explanation,
not of administration" and therefore should not affect the legal determination of
narrow tailoring).
115 Id. at 2790.
116 Id. at 2791. Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy does not seem to
distinguish voluntary separation via housing patterns, etc. from resegregation.
117 Id. Additionally, he stated that school districts are not required to accept
racial isolation as the status quo. Id.
118 Id. ("The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest
government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their
race"). While "legitimate interest" is clearly a requirement of the rational basis
standard of review, Justice Kennedy is fully aware that strict scrutiny is
applicable to racial classifications as he himself stated, Id. at 2789. What is
unclear is whether in this particular statement he was embracing equal
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Perhaps, one of the two greatest sources of hope for school
districts' use of race-conscious measures in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence comes from his following statement: "If school
authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of
certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal
educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to
devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a
general way and without treating each student in different fashion
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race."
120
He not only welcomes the use of race-conscious measures, but also
confers discretion in the devise of measures to school districts. 121
One thing school districts must keep in mind is that any
race-conscious measure they devise must deal with the problems
being addressed in a general way, without individual typing by
race. 122 In essence, what Justice Kennedy condemns is not typing
educational opportunity as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny; especially,
given the fact that what the plurality statement he was criticizing stated that the
disputed nature of the evidence made the interest in equal educational
opportunity proffered by the school district not compelling. Even if this
particular statement was not an embrace of equal educational opportunity as a
compelling interest, as noted below, Justice Kennedy seems to recognize this
interest as compelling.
'9 Id In his analysis of the compelling interest strand of strict scrutiny, Justice
Kennedy clearly stated that school districts can constitutionally pursue an
interest in providing equal educational opportunity. Id. at 2792.
120 Parents Involved, at 2972 (emphasis added).
121 See id. ("If school authorities are concerned ... they are free to devise race-
conscious measures").
122 Id. Justice Kennedy's opinion emphasizes the fact that race-conscious
measures must be designed to address problems in a general way without
individual typing by race. The key word is "individual." Kennedy believes that
decisions about admissions are very specific at the individual level, e.g., specific
individual students are individually denied admission to specific schools based
on that specific individual's race. Thus, admissions decisions based on race
would necessarily involve individual typing by race. Illustrative of his
disapproval of plans that individually type students by race, Justice Kennedy
repeatedly emphasizes the words "each" and "individual" to convey the highly
personal and individual level use of race which he disapproves. See, e.g., id. at
2792 ("Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude
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by race, but rather individual typing by race. 123 That is the reason
Justice Kennedy is willing to allow school districts to pursue
compelling interests in student body diversity or equal educational
opportunity by typing by race.' 2 4 While school admission decisions
system of individual racial classifications is quite a different matter"). See, also,
id. ("Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students by
race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in the
school districts. Yet, as explained, each has failed to provide the support
necessary for that proposition ... individual racial classifications employed in
this manner may be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve
a compelling interest"). Thus, while Justice Kennedy strongly disapproves of
individual typing by race, he will allow it "as a last resort to achieve a
compelling interest."Id at 2972. He seems more willing to accept it even as this
last resort in cases of dejure as opposed defacto discrimination, though he does
not foreclose it in cases of de facto discrimination, as long as alternatives to
individual treatment by race are considered. See id. at 2796 ("The Court has
allowed school districts to remedy their prior dejure segregation by classifying
individual students based on their race. The limitation of this power to instances
where there has been de jure segregation serves to confine the nature, extent,
and duration of governmental reliance on individual racial classifications. The
cases here were argued upon the assumption, and come to us on the premise,
that the discrimination in question did not result from dejure actions. And when
defacto discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that the remedial rules
are different. The State must seek alternatives to the classification and
differential treatment of individuals by race, at least absent some extraordinary
showing not present here") (internal citations omitted).
123 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2792. Individual typing would include, for
example, the "assignment of individual students by race" Id., with the key
emphasis on the impact of the typing on the individual student at a personalized
level.
124 Id. ("If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions
of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
measures [i.e. typing by race] to address the problem in a general way and
without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a
systematic, individual typing by race") (emphasis added). To reiterate this
important point in yet another way,, it seems all that Justice Kennedy would
prohibit are mechanisms or means that individually type by race, i.e.
mechanisms that "lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells
each student he or she is to be defined by race." Id. (emphasis added). It is very
important to keep this in mind to fully contextualize Justice Kennedy's opinion.
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and use of race in admissions that are highly personal and
individualized to each student affected, race-based measures that
are more global and at a generalized level might be looked at more
favorably by Justice Kennedy. Optimism lives on even for race-
conscious measures which individually type by race, if they are "a
last resort to achieve a compelling interest."
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The second of the two greatest sources of hope in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence can be found in the following statements:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other
means, including strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance,
and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are race
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be
defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand
strict scrutiny to be found permissible.'
26
It should be welcome news to school districts that he
seems to endorse a wide range of means; moreover, the list is not
exclusive. 127 School districts might also be encouraged to learn that
Justice Kennedy is not likely to subject such means as identified
above to strict scrutiny because they do not involve individual
typing by race. 128 Two essential points that might better inform
school districts seeking to implement race-conscious measures
125 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2792.
126 id.
127 Id.
128 Id, ("These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treat-
ment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible." Id., citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)).
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emerge from this analysis. First, the use of race-conscious mea-
sures in a generalized fashion, i.e., global approach, might not be
subjected to strict scrutiny under a Justice Kennedy analysis. While
it remains a mystery whether he would apply intermediate scrutiny
or some modified version of rational basis review,12 9 without
question, either would be more favorable for race-conscious
measures than strict scrutiny. Secondly, even if the race-conscious
measure involves individual typing by race, in which case strict
scrutiny applies, as a last resort to satisfy a compelling interest,
Justice Kennedy might find the means constitutionally
permissible.'
30
Justice Kennedy subscribes to the "minimal effect/impact"
principle of the narrow tailoring requirement. 131 Therefore, to sur-
vive Justice Kennedy's narrow tailoring analysis, school districts
might seek to ensure that the race-conscious measure has more
than a minimal impact. Furthermore, school districts might have a
more favorable audience with Justice Kennedy if their race-
conscious measure comprehends "a more nuanced, individual
evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might
include race as a component."' 132 Justice Kennedy concludes on an
optimistic note, urging school districts to be creative in the use of
race-conscious measures to achieve compelling interests. 133 In all,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence seems to indicate an opportunity
"29 Justice Kennedy is ostensibly opposed to the use of rational basis in
reviewing racial classifications, see Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2793.
130 Recall, compelling interests Justice Kennedy recognizes include student body
diversity and equal educational opportunity. Id. at 2791, 2793.
131 See discussion of this principle under Court Opinion, section III.A, supra; see
also Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2760.
132 Id at 2793. He amplified, however, that this approach "would be informed by
Grutter, though of course the criteria relevant to student placement would differ
based on the age of the students, the needs of the parents, and the role of the
schools." Id. In fact, this reference to "a more nuanced, individual evaluation of
school needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component"
is actually a reference to the use of race as a plus factor in admissions which the
Court approved of for higher education admissions in Grutter.
... Id. at 2797.
Vol. XXVI
2007-2008 Parents Involved and Race-Conscious Measures 31
for the benignant swing vote in a constitutional challenge to race-
conscious measures which satisfy the principles we have identified
from his opinion in this article.
E. Justice Steven's Dissent
While in absolute accord with Justice Breyer's opinion for
the dissenting Justices,' 34 Justice Stevens wrote separately to
register his condemnation of the plurality's decision to subject all
racial classifications to strict scrutiny.' 35 The crux of Justice
Steven's dissent lies in the fact that he would apply strict scrutiny
to racial classifications that exclude members of a minority group
on account of race and a less stringent standard to classifications
designed to include members of a minority group, especially in the
context of education. 136 The actual substance of the less stringent
standard he would apply remains a mystery.' 37 One thing we do
know is that Justice Breyer condemns "a rigid adherence to tiers of
scrutiny [because it] obscures Brown's message."' 38 Another
purpose Justice Stevens recognizes for inclusion is use of race-
conscious measures to employ more minority teachers.' 39 In sum,
Justice Steven's dissent seems positive for school districts seeking
to use race-conscious measures for purposes of inclusion, even
without a finding of past intentional discrimination.' 
40
F. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Breyer, reveals
that the four dissenting Justices would permit school districts to
134 See infra section IIL.F.
135 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2798-99.
136 id. at 2798, n.3.
137 However, we do know from Justice Breyer's opinion for the dissenting
Justices that this less stringent standard is clearly not "strict in theory, but fatal
in fact." Id. at 2817.
138 Id at 2799.
9 Id. at 2798, nn. 3-4.
140 Id at 2798-99.
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use race-conscious measures and would scrutinize such measures
under a less stringent standard of review than traditional strict
scrutiny.' 4  This follows from their recognition of constitutional
merit for inclusionary race-conscious measures as opposed to
disfavored exclusionary measures.142 Thus, it is no surprise that
they found the race-based plans in Parents Involved to be
inclusionary plans that were narrowly tailored to serve compelling
interests. 143 According to the Justices, "[a] longstanding and
141 See id. at 2816-17 (explaining that while foundational cases apply the
traditional "strict scrutiny test in a manner that is 'fatal in fact' only to racial
classifications that harmfully exclude; they apply the test in a manner that is not
fatal in fact to racial classifications that seek to include") (emphasis in original).
142 See id at 2815 ("Swann is predicated upon a well-established legal view of
the Fourteenth Amendment. That view understands the basic objective of those
who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial
exclusion ... There is reason to believe that those who drafted an Amendment
with this basic purpose in mind would have understood the legal and practical
difference between the use of race-conscious criteria in defiance of that purpose,
namely to keep the races apart, and the use of race-conscious criteria to further
that purpose, namely to bring the races together ... Although the Constitution
almost always forbids the former, it is significantly more lenient in respect to the
latter") (internal quotes and citations omitted). See also id. ("Sometimes
Members of this Court have disagreed about the degree of leniency that the
Clause affords to programs designed to include ... But I can find no case in
which this Court has followed Justice THOMAS' colorblind approach. And I
have found no case that otherwise repudiated this constitutional asymmetry
between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of
minority races") (emphasis in original) (internal quotes and citations omitted).
143 Id. at 2800, 2802, 2820-31. Unlike the plurality, the dissenting Justices
believe that the distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination is futile.
They also believe that the Constitution does not rule out all race conscious
programs that attempt to create racially diverse -instead of racially segregated -
schools. See id. at 2802-11 (The critical point is that "[a] court finding of dejure
segregation cannot be the crucial variable."). With respect to narrow tailoring,
the dissenting judges found no example in precedent that would allow less use
of race classifications than the race-based assignment plans in this case,
affirming their conclusion that the plans were narrowly tailored. See id. at 2827
("Yet, I have found no example or model that would permit this Court to say to
Seattle and to Louisville: 'Here is an instance of a desegregation plan that is
likely to achieve your objectives and also makes less use of race-conscious
criteria than your plans.' And, if the plurality cannot suggest such a model--and
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unbroken line of legal authority tell us that the Equal Protection
Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to
achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution
does not compel it.',144 The dissenting four are willing to give wide
latitude to school districts. Changing demographics, the need to
meet learning goals, to recruit and retain effective teachers,
parents' views, commitment to public education and insufficiency
of the school district's knowledge and good faith to adequately
address challenges requires that, with respect to means, school
districts have broad discretion so that they can experiment with
diverse strategies and "gravitate toward those that prove most
successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs."'
145
In fact, the dissenting Justices criticized the plurality for their
invalidation of the Seattle and Jefferson County race-conscious
measures, warning that: "The last half-century has witnessed great
strides toward racial equality, but we have not yet realized the
promise of Brown. To invalidate the plans under review is to
threaten the promise of Brown. The plurality's position, I fear,
would break that promise. This is a decision that the Court and the
Nation will come to regret."'
146
The dissenting Justices would review race-conscious
measures designed for benign or beneficial purposes under strict
it cannot--then it seeks to impose a 'narrow tailoring' requirement that in
practice would never be met").
144 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2811. Similarly, the dissenting Justices stated
that it is a constitutionally valid legal principle "that the government may
voluntarily adopt race-conscious measures to improve conditions of race even
when it is not under a constitutional obligation to do so. That principle has been
accepted by every branch of government and is rooted in the history of the Equal
Protection Clause itself." Id. at 2814. This would favor race-conscious measures.
Where race-conscious measures present concerns raised by Justices Thomas and
Kennedy, the dissenting Justices would still give school districts discretion to
decide whether the interests in using the measures nonetheless outweigh those
concerns. Id. at 2819.
145 Id. at 2811, quoting Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir.
2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
581 (1995) (Kennedy, J. concurring)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061 (2005).
146 Id. at 2837.
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scrutiny that is not "strict in theory but fatal in fact.' ' 147 Contra to
strict scrutiny that is "strict in theory but fatal in fact" used to
invalidate exclusionary race-conscious measures; strict scrutiny
that is not "strict in theory but fatal in fact" is not likely to
invalidate race-conscious measures with benign purposes. 148 This
is a positive for school districts seeking to use race-conscious
measures for benign ends.
The Justices recognized a compelling interest in racial
integration of the school districts. 149 This interest has three ele-
ments: (i) remedial; 150 (ii) educational;
15 1 and (iii) democratic. 152
The interest represented in the remedial element is the "interest in
continuing to combat the remnants of segregation caused in whole
or in part by these [legal or administrative] school-related policies,
which have often affected not only schools, but also housing
patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social
attitudes."'' 53 This remedial element is founded on school districts'
147 Id. at 2816-18. Even under strict scrutiny that is not "strict in theory but fatal
in fact", school districts must show that they have a compelling interest and that
the means chosen are narrowly tailored to achieve those interest. Id at 2820.
The application of these requirements however is more lenient. Id. at 2819. This
standard still requires "judicial efforts carefully to determine the need for race-
conscious criteria and the criteria's tailoring in light of the need." Id.
.48 Id. at 2816-18.
149 According to the dissenting Justices, this interest is also known as the interest
in racial diversity or racial balancing. Id. at 2820. This interest refers to "the
school districts' interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and
increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the district's
schools and each individual student's public school experience." Id. The Justices
fortitudinously characterize the interest as racial diversity, rather the general
interest in student body diversity (of which race is only one component) the
plurality recognized in the case.
150 id.
151 Id. at 2820-21.
1 Id at 2821
153 Id. (emphasis added). This is not an interest in eliminating the remnants of
general societal discrimination, "but of [eliminating the remnants] of primary
and secondary school segregation." Id at 2823. Remedial interests do not
"vanish the day after a federal court declares that a district is unitary." Id at
2824 (internal quotes omitted).
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interest "in preventing what gradually may become the de facto
resegregation of America's public schools."' 54 It seems that since
the interest represented in the remedial element embraces both de
facto segregation and remnants of segregation, the Justices would
permit race-conscious measures designed to combat de facto
segregation and the remnants of segregation.'
55
The educational element represents the "interest in over-
coming the adverse educational effects produced by and associated
with highly segregated schools."' 156 This language suggests that the
Justices would uphold race-conscious measures designed to
overcome adverse educational impacts in highly segregated
schools.
The democratic element represents the "interest in
producing an educational element that reflects the 'pluralistic
society' in which our children will live."' 157 If school districts
design their race-conscious measure for this end, this democratic
element indicates that the Justices would uphold the measure.
158
A conglomerate of factors made the Justices find the race-
based plans in Parents Involved narrowly tailored. These factors
might serve as helpful guidelines for school district's design of
race-conscious measures more likely to survive the "narrow
tailoring" analysis of the dissenting Justices. One factor indicates
that race-conscious measures that merely "set the outer bounds of
114 Id. at 2820.
155 While in Parents Involved, the three elements were included in the discussion
of racial integration, nothing in the language of the discussion of the remedial
and educational elements indicates that the Justices would necessarily limit their
application to the cases of racial integration and not apply them to other race-
conscious measures. Even if the language is somehow interpreted to limit their
application, the same rationales underlying the elements would seem to apply to
race-conscious measures beyond racial balancing.
1
5 6 Id. at 2820.
157 Id. at 2821 (internal quotes omitted).
158 In his dissent, Justice Breyer also describes this element as "an interest in
helping our children learn to work and play together with children of different
racial backgrounds." Id.
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broad ranges"'159 are more likely to be favored by the Justices. In
other words, race-conscious measures that "constitute but one part
of plans that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements."' 
60
Thus, race-conscious measures for which race is merely a "plus
factor" might find four approbatory Justices. 61
A second factor provides that if broad-range limits are used
in race-conscious measures, they might pass "narrow tailoring"
muster, as the dissenting Justices do not view broad-range limits as
very burdensome. 62 For example, the Justices explained that the
broad-range limits used in the race-based assignment plans were
not burdensome because they assured that race only played a role
in a fraction of non-merit-based assignments as opposed to large
numbers of merit-based assignments. 1
63
A third factor provides that race-conscious measures which
embody local experiences and community consultation, and reflect
a diminishing use of race relative to prior race-conscious measures
in the given community, such as mandatory busing, might be more
likely to pass "narrow tailoring" muster. 64 The Justices deemed
159 Id. at 2824. See also id. at 2825 (stating that "the broad ranges are less like a
quota and more like the kinds of 'useful starting points' that this Court has
consistently found permissible").
160 Id. at 2824. According to the Justices, the primary element in the race-based
assignment plans in Parents Involved was student choice not race. See id. at
2825 ("In fact, the defining feature of both plans is greater emphasis upon
student choice. In Seattle, for example, in more than 80% of all cases, that
choice alone determines which high schools Seattle's ninth graders will attend.
After ninth grade, students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred
district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria).
Choice, therefore, is the "predominant factor" in these plans. Race is not")
(emphasis in original).
161 In fact, in all at least five Justices would approve plans in which race is
merely a plus factor. As pointed out earlier, Justice Kennedy indicated the use of
race as a plus factor is acceptable when he stated that "a more nuanced,
individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might
include race as a component" is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 2793.
162 Id. at 2824.
163 id.
164 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2825-26.
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the fact that the race-based assignment plans in Seattle and
Jefferson County reflected a diminishing emphasis on race relative
to mandatory busing, for example, as a plus factor in its "narrow
tailoring" analysis.'
A fourth factor indicates that the lack of reasonable
alternatives could boost a race-conscious measure's chances of
passing the dissenting quartet's "narrow tailoring" muster.' 66 The
demonstration of a lack of reasonable alternatives does not require
"proof that there is no hypothetical other plan that could work as
well."' 167 Thus, it is a more lenient standard than a cursory
examination would have revealed.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have analyzed the various opinions filed
in the Parents Involved case, to determine the constitutional
viability of race-conscious measures in school districts. Contrary to
widespread misperception based on media reports in the days
following the decision, we have revealed that Parents Involved
does not foreclose all future uses of race-conscious measures in
schools. Each of the opinions in the case identifies certain
principles discussed herein which might increase the likelihood
that a school district's race-conscious measure would be upheld by
the applicable Justices or group of Justices. Therefore, there might
be cause for school districts to remain optimistic and work toward
bringing their race-conscious measures in compliance with prin-
ciples the Justices are likely to give weight to in a constitutional
challenge.
165 Id. Given the dissenting Justices' view that local school districts have great
expertise in matters affecting education and should enjoy judicial deference to
experiment for educational excellence, the Justices seem willing to encourage
school district creativity as to measures which relatively progressively
deemphasize race. Id. at 2826.
'661d. at 2829.
167 Id. at 2827.
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While the ideological divide on the Court indicates that the
dissenting Justices are more likely to favor race-conscious mea-
sures, as evident in the 5-4 split in the decision Justice Kennedy's
swing vote is not lost. Our analysis indicates that if certain
principles such as we have discussed herein are satisfied, Justice
Kennedy might uphold the measure. A 6-3 decision is not totally
out of the question either, given Chief Justice Roberts' indication
that he is willing to listen. The key to surviving constitutional
scrutiny of a race-conscious measure might be in school districts
ensuring that their measures comply with the various principles
important to the Parents Involved plurality, the dissenting Justices
and Justice Kennedy, the pivotal vote, rather than merely trying to
comply with principles of the plurality of Justices or that of the
dissenting quartet. In other words, the design of measures should
not reflect a "pick and choose" approach in which school districts
decide what principles of the various opinions they want to
implement. They might better maximize the prospect of surviving
scrutiny if efforts are targeted toward satisfying as many principles
in the various opinions as possible. As we have revealed herein,
Justice Kennedy is only a principle away from voting with the
dissent to uphold a race-conscious measure.
We end on the positive note that even after Parents
Involved, there remains cause for optimism, for race-conscious
measures are still constitutionally viable; after all, "we have not yet
realized the promise of Brown." 
168
168 Id. at 2837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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